Is Coconut Water the Next Greek Yogurt?

The US coconut water category is now worth well over $400 million, an increase of well over 500% since 2010. While the category will be challenged to sustain this historic growth trajectory, much like Greek yogurt did to the yogurt category, it is already helping change the type of beverages Americans consume albeit on a much smaller scale.

A decade ago, Greek yogurt made up less than 1% of all U.S. yogurt sales. Now it makes up more than half. In doing so, not only did the Greek yogurt revolution reignite category growth, but more importantly it changed the way consumers and retailers think about the yogurt category.  More specifically, Greek yogurt accomplished three things: 

1. Boosted the category's health benefits by packing in several grams of protein
2. Became more than a meal in itself, but also an ingredient in other 
3. Broadened Americans' yogurt palates and opened their minds to other new types of yogurt (i.e., Australian, Icelandic, Asian, lactose free, sheep’s milk, goat’s milk, soy ,and Chia Pods)

In a very similar fashion, coconut water is accomplishing all three of these same results.

1. Much of coconut water's initial growth came from claims that it was a ultra-hydrating sports drink packed with natural electrolytes (i.e., potassium and sodium). While many brands have backed away from these initial claims, the category is still widely marketed as a natural beverage without artificial ingredients - which is an implicit 'better for you' health claim. And, in reality, this softer claim likely has broader appeal and relevancy among the mainstream market.
2. Coconut water is becoming increasing used as an ingredient in a broad range of meal recipes, smoothies, and cocktails, as well as, an ingredient in personal care products such as shampoo and skin care.
3. Even as the coconut category continues to mature and diversify its range of flavors, it's success has already triggered the next wave of plant-based water innovation. Many of the emerging brands in this next wave also claim to have hydration and nutrition benefits for athletes. Emerging variations include:
   • Maple Water. Maple water stems from maple tree sap and claims to be a source of manganese, calcium, and other vitamins. A few brand examples include Drink Maple, Happy Tree, Vertical Water, and Seva.

   • Cherry Juice. The largest cherry juice brand is Cheribundi. Cherry juice takes the health claims to the next level by suggesting it acts as an anti-inflammatory that helps post-workout recovery by reducing muscle pain.

   • Beet Juice. Beet juice allegedly increases blood and oxygen flow to athletes' muscles which in turn helps boost endurance.
   • King Coconut. King coconuts are related, but differ from the green coconuts used in traditional coconut water. They reportedly have more vitamin c and a softer taste profile

   
   

Going forward, its safe to assume, coconut water will benefit from the sustained upward trends of  better-for-you beverages and “clean labels”. While the category will continue to grow, its somewhat polarizing flavor profile may prevent it from ever reaching the size of Greek yogurt category in the US.  Nonetheless, coconut water is causing increasingly big ripples in the beverage category and remains a category worth watching.

Are Consumers Souring on Chobani? Is the Brand at a Tipping Point?

In the matter of only a few years Chobani, the leading Greek Yogurt brand in America, has transformed itself from a small challenger brand into a $1 billion power-player that is giving Yoplait and Dannon a run for their money in the dairy aisle. And in full disclosure, I'm a huge fan of how Chobani built its brand (the unique product/packaging, the challenger brand refusing to back down to the traditional yogurt powerhouses, the innovation, the CEO's vision, etc.), not to mention the delicious product. There's no doubt, Chobani's rise has been magical, with it looking like the brand could do no wrong, that is until recently . . .

Chobani has hit a number of stumbling blocks over the last few months that risk alienating core consumers and challenging the long-term health of the brand. During its meteoric rise, Chobani built a tremendous groundswell of passionate, loyal core consumers. This consumer-base allowed the brand to grow organically through strong consumer advocacy, without having to spend large sums of money on traditional marketing to compete with Dannon and Yoplait. However, there are now cracks in that consumer-base. It's astonishing how many passionate negative comments have appeared on Chobani's facebook page over the last few months. Yes, there are a ton of passionate positive ones too to offset the negative advocacy, but still its troubling for the longer-term brand health. Taking a closer look at the different brand stumbles suggests the cumulative effect of all of these stumbles should be alarming for Chobani.

• Chobani issued a recall after finding a portion of its yogurt was tainted by mold, which caused over 100 consumers to become sick with symptoms including nausea and cramps. While the majority of consumers are willing to forgive and forget assuming this was a one time mistake and the company appears to have handled the mini-crisis with sincerity, events like this start chipping away at a brands trust - especially a brand with a slogan of "nothing but good". Take a read of a few of the several hundred facebook posts:

• Consumers became aware that Chobani is not sure if the grain fed to the cows producing the milk contains GMOs (genetically modified organisms). The GMO finding is very interesting because it again directly clashes with Chobani's promise of "nothing but good". As the facebook posts below illustrate, this realization is upsetting and alienating many of its core consumers. That said, the learning would be far more damaging to short-term brand sales if Chobani was still a small brand that relied on distribution from Whole Foods and other natural and premium grocery stores. Given a bulk of brand sales now come from the likes of Walmart and mainstream grocery stores, the more mainstream consumers are unlikely to blink much of an eye, at least in the short-term.    

• Chobani is downsizing its product from 6.0 to 5.3 ounces, while holding price constant equating to effectively a 12% price increase. Let's just say consumers are not going to be happy about this. Look at a few comments of the hundreds from Chobani's facebook page:

• Whole Foods announced it would de-list Chobani by early 2014. Whole Foods decision to de-list Chobani is really not a surprise given both the GMO issue as well as the brand transitioning from a unique, premium product to a mainstream, mass market mainstay. Chobani grew to over $1 billion in large part by expanding distribution from Whole Foods into mainstream grocery stores, Target, Walmart, Costco, Sam's, and many other retailers. Whole Foods' strategy is to charge a premium price on a differentiated product assortment from more mainstream channels, so as Chobani grew it became at odds with this core strategy. Whole Foods actually held distribution on Chobani longer than it typically does with most brands that mainstream - likely in large part because of Chobani's loyal consumer base and the brand's initial reluctance to discount its products in traditional grocery, mass, and club channels. These combination of factors allowed Whole Foods to maintain its margin integrity.  However, as the yogurt wars heated up and Chobani expanded production capacity (believe it or not for many months Chobani was actually selling faster than the company could manufacture it), it appears that Chobani has started playing the promotion game to fend off competition and win back consumers from the product recall. Overall, losing Whole Foods doesn't just mean lost sales, but is also another challenge to the brand image and keeping its original core consumer group.

Net-net, the combination of all of these brand stumbles will have a short-term impact on the business (e.g., the lost volume during the from the product recall, Whole Foods de-listing, downsizing), but more importantly, I believe they represent a longer-term tipping point for the brand where it will start losing an important sub-set of its passionate core consumers. These core consumers were likely some of the original supports of the brand, early advocates that spread word of mouth, and helped fuel the organic brand growth. These consumers shop at Whole Foods, believed "nothing but good" meant safe (no contamination) and pure (no GMOs), and were willing to pay more than traditional yogurt for Chobani because they felt like they were getting more from the brand (both literally an additional 0.7 ounces and figuratively in an emotional connection to the brand). Can Chobani win these consumers back before its too late?  Potentially, but to do so would require a shorter-term financial hit to the brand. I'd anticipate these consumers finding, latching onto, and starting to champion a new premium yogurt brand in Whole Foods' dairy section and helping to start building that brand. In fact, it looks like it's already starting . . .

The Yogurt Wars Heat Up and YOPLAIT Appears One Step Behind . . . AGAIN

The US yogurt wars are heating up again and about to become even more intense...and Yoplait appears to be one step behind again.

For years the US yogurt market was dominated by Yoplait and Dannon. However, five years ago the US market was fundamentally changed with the emergence of Chobani, which helped usher in the Greek yogurt revolution.

As Greek yogurt mainstreamed growing from 4% of the US yogurt market in 2008 to nearly 45% in 2012, Chobani was transformed a small challenger brands into a $1 billion power-player that is giving Yoplait and Dannon a run for their money.

Dannon reacted with the 2011 launch of its Greek yogurt sub-brand Oikos. Oikos growth has been tremendous, surpassing over $400 million 2012, which is a ~45% growth from its first year sales. Not only was Dannon able to leverage the brand to grow the overall Greek Yogurt segment, but also start winning back some share from Chobani by advertising its superior taste behind a claim that Oikos is preferred 2 to 1 over the leading brand.

On the other hand, more than 2 years later Yoplait is still trying to figure out how to win in Greek yogurt.  Yoplait's initial entry into Greek Yogurt was a bust...as was its first relaunch attempt in 2011. Now Yoplait, which is owned by General Mills, is hoping to make up for lost ground by relaunching its Yoplait Greek yogurt again, this time behind a new formula, packaging and advertising. In it's new TV ads, Yoplait declares that "it's time healthy gets a dose of happy" and carry the tag line "it's time to lick the lid again."

The insight Yoplait is basing its bet on is that American consumers will prefer a less sour Greek yogurt and fruit pre-blended into the yogurt, as opposed to being on the bottom of the container.  I personally, don't buy that this positioning will be enough to catch up to Chobani and Dannon, but it will likely be sufficient to remain relevant in the category.

Meanwhile, as Yoplait focuses on and invests in getting its base Greek yogurt offering right, the yogurt market is about to take its next major transformation - adult yogurts with flavor enhancing add-in. 

• First Pepsi's Quaker unit launched Muller (a new joint venture with a European based yogurt company) that features an extensive line of flavor add-ins.  Expect major marketing pushes behind this product over the next several months

• Chobani's answer was to launch  "Flip" and "Bite" sub-lines.

• Now Dannon is jumping into the game via its recent acquisition of YoCrunch, the market leader in yogurt mix-ins.  YoCrunch features 27 different varieties of mix-ins (though most are geared at kids).  Not only does the YoCrunch acquisition give Dannon instant market share in this segment, but more importantly instant access to critical packaging capabilities that will eventually allow Dannon to bring this innovation to their Dannon brands.

While Yoplait does have a mix-in granola offering...

...its already a step or two behind and is going to have to quickly invest in major innovation to keep its offering competitive. But in all likelihood, Yoplait will be spending the the next few years playing catch up again.  Proof a market leader can never stop innovating or it risks being surpassed.

Pepsi acquisition of Mondelez?

Activist shareholder Nelson Peltz has recently gone public about his latest bid to shake-up the consumer package goods industry by pushing PepsiCo Inc to buy Mondelez International Inc for more than $62 billion. As part of his plan, Pepsi would then spin-off its soft drink business to become a global snack food behemoth.

Give Peltz point for thinking big and seeing the power of a tremendous power combination. Pepsico is a $65 billion dollar beverage and food conglomerate with 22 billion dollar brands. It includes it's Pepsi-Cola beverage division, Frito-Lay brands, and Quaker, Tropicana and Gatorade. The Frito-Lay North American business unit is a $13 billion business with a clear #1 share of the snacks category. While Mondelez is a self-described "$35 billion, global snacks powerhouse" sold across 165 countries and 9 billion dollar brands.  It's power brand portfolio primarily covers the biscuits category (e.g., Nabisco, Oreo, Chips AhoyWheat Thins, Triscuit, Ritz) and Chocolate/Candy/Gum (e.g., Cadbury, Toblerone, Trident, Halls). The combination of these two companies is initially a bit mind-boggling.

Potential Benefits:

• Given Frito-Lay already owns the salty-snack aisle, while Mondelez's Nabisco owns the cookie/cracker aisle, the merger would give the new company dominant control of the snack section of your grocery store. This scale would give the company incredible negotiating power with suppliers/retailers and create significant advantages over remaining competitors.  
• The deal could offer huge potential cost savings by combining direct-store-delivery (DSD) networks as well as expanded DSD reach for Nabisco into the convenience store channel
• It also creates large international expansion opportunities for Frito-Lay by leveraging Cadbury's legacy international sales & distribution networks (Kraft purchased Cadbury for nearly $20 billion dollars in 2010 before the company was split into Kraft and Mondelez to leverage these networks to boost its own international expansion) 

Potential Challenges:

• Pepsico is said to be resistant to the idea of spinning-off its beverage business. That said, the Kraft/Mondelez split was also initially surprising, so while this is a challenge, it may not be an immoveable barrier
• Mondelez has under-performed expectations since the Kraft spin-off, weighed down by economic woes in Europe among other factors, and a merger with Pepsi does nothing to help ignite top-line growth. Without steady growth, Mondelez is significantly less appealing
• While the combined snack food behemoth would surely benefit from international expansion into fast growing developing markets, its lack of product diversification could put its core US business at risk to rising health trends in the US and in the rest of the developed world (much like the Pepsi soda business is today)
• There are also likely major cultural challenges in merging Mondelez and Frito-Lay. For example, the two companies have historically had very different brand management frameworks. Mondelez/Kraft has a very well respected general management approach, while Frito-Lay has historically focused their marketers energy more towards advertising. It would be interesting to see where a joint organization would end up. No doubt the cost of merging the two organizations together would be costly and the integration likely taking years to come to full fruition
• You'd have to imagine that a deal this size would at least raise some anti-trust caution flags, given the concentration in the snack food and the DSD structure of the category that essentially makes it nearly very difficult for new competitors to win shelf space

Initially the idea seemed very farfetched, but the more you consider the tremendous scale opportunity from the potential acquisition/merger it actually becomes quite an intriguing possibility that would no doubt remake the CPG landscape. 

That said, even if Peltz is able to convince the boards and shareholders, a lot would still have to go right for the merger to be a success. Take for example the P&G and Gillette merger. While one could argue that the P&G acquisition of Gillette has been a large success, much of the upside P&G initially thought it could easily capture by slapping the Gillette brand on its historic female skin/body care capabilities to win in men's skin/body care still hasn't come to fruition despite several years of trying and hundred of millions of dollars in investment.

It will be interesting to see how the Pepsi/Mondelez situation plays out, if nothing else its fun to think about the potential of the combination.

On Second Thought - JCPenney Brings Back Sales

Attention shoppers, a JCPenney sale will be coming to a store near you soon! 

That's right, nearly one year after announcing it was phasing out its traditional sales promotion strategy, JCPenney has done an about-face and will now significantly increase its pricing discounting strategy.  This step is aimed at increasing traffic by making the chain appear more price competitive to its peer set.

By killing traditional promotions, JCP severely damaged its value perception.  In an effort to further battle negative consumer value perceptions, JCP will also introducing price tags that include also show what competitors are charging for the same merchandise.  The big question is it too little, too late given JCP same store sales declined over 25% in 2012?

JCP's major mistake was thinking they could retrain consumer behavior - that is train consumers to move from shopping a high/low strategy to an everyday low price mindset - consumers love a value treasure hunt. Needless to say this would be an extremely difficult task for even the strongest brand to take on (e.g., Apple), but it proved to be an impossible for a merely average brand with limited equity and loyalty.  Sorry CEO Ron Johnson, you cannot turn a JCP into Apple overnight.

The sad thing is that much of Ron Johnson's transformation turnaround plan is right on - building a portfolio of exclusive brands, dramatically revolutionizing the JCP shopping experience and re-staging the brand image.  If he had only been more patient and executed these strategic elements prior to changing the promotion strategy as opposed to trying to move simultaneously, he may have successfully increased consumer traction, loyalty and advocacy.  This would have then given him more permission to then cut back the level of promotion.

Why Walmart or Kroger could buy Hostess

The latest M&A rumor mill reports that both Walmart and Kroger are among a dozen or so potential bidders for the now bankrupt Hostess brands, which include classic American iconic brands such as Wonder Bread and Twinkie.

On the surface a grocery retailer buying a national packaged food manufacturer seems like an odd fit, because if either tore won the bidding process and ultimately integrated the business they'd most probably either pull the brands' distribution from competitors shelves or eventually get kicked out.  The resulting lose of distribution would almost surely mean that the brand sales would shrink resulting in a smaller business.

However, retailer times are a changing.  With the emergence of Whole Foods, Trader Joe's, Costco, Dollar Stores, and even Big Lots into the grocery space, traditional supermarkets like Kroger are facing more pressure than ever, while Walmart (the largest seller of groceries in the US) is also getting squeezed.  This means traditional grocery stores have had to differentiate themselves and give consumers new reasons to visit - developing winning private label businesses has been a major component if these efforts.

While supermarkets have seen success with private label and many retailers have even added multiple different private label brands, up until this point adding in exclusive national brands has not been a major strategy of in the traditional grocery industry.  The only notable exception that comes to mind is Walmart exclusive brand 'White Cloud' toilet paper, which was actually recently named Consumer Reports top toilet paper in the nation.  White Cloud was original created by Procter & Gamble and at one point was a leading 2-ply toilet paper in the U.S., but P&G decided to kill it and invest all their resources behind Charmin.  P&G then made the fatal mistake of allowing their trademark rights on White Cloud to expire and the right were quickly snatched up by Paper Partners, which later agreed to give Walmart exclusive U.S. selling rights.

On the other hand, departments stores have been proving that building a compelling exclusive brand strategy has worked to rebuilding store traffic and driving growth.  For example, Macy's, which has a stable of exclusive brands, reportedly generates over 40 percent of its revenue from private, exclusive and limited-distribution brands (including: Ellen Tracy, Threads & Heirs, mstylelab, Kouture by Kimora and Kenneth Cole REACTION men’s, American Rag, Charter Club, INC International Concepts, Martha Stewart Collection and Hotel Collection). JC Penney has been following a similar strategy by being the exclusive department store retailer for brands such as Liz Claiborne, MNG by Mango and Call it Spring by The Aldo Group.

Thus, it's not surprising that the concept will eventually make it's way into the supermarket space.  Supermarkets executives have become increasingly more savvy in acting like CPG manufacturers and now their private label development capabilities would allow them to easily expand the strong brand names to new products cheaply and efficiently because they could guarantee themselves shelf space and promotion support.  And there is no better platform to start building your exclusive brand portfolio tan on the back of iconic American heritage brands.

Avis No Longer Tries Harder

Avis recently announced that it was overhauling its brand strategy by retiring  its infamous tagline "We Try Harder" after over 5 decades and replacing it with the new tagline "It's Your Space".

The move is being pioneered by Avis' new CMO, Jeannine Haas, whose prior work experience includes stints at American Express and Ford Motor Co.  In a recent interview Jeannine explained the move by saying "Consumer-centric brands must always evolve in order to keep pace with ever-changing customer needs and preferences . . . Avis is evolving as a premium brand to better meet those needs. . . [the goal of the re-branding is to be] reflective of [Avis'] ongoing mission to be a customer-led, service-driven company, and presents the brand in terms of the customer experience and the advantages inherent in renting from Avis"


The new tagline, "It's Your Space", is supposedly targeted at business travelers and hypes up the fact that business travelers can recharge or be productive in the sanctuary of the car cabin. Avis' website even says, "With Avis it's more than a rental. It's your space."

My first reaction to this new marketing and brand strategy was it is a bad idea, my second reaction is its an AWFUL idea. . . Now I have no doubt that Jeannine and her marketing did plenty of consumer research that indicated "We Try Harder" doesn't resonate anymore with consumers.  But being customer-centric doesn't always mean taking what the consumer says literally.  My guess is that the essence behind the tagline is just as relevant as ever, it's just the customer experience has drifted far from this ideal.

In my opinion, "We Try Harder" is not just a tagline, it's a deep part of the brand's DNA and an important part of the consumer equity.  As a opposed to moving away from "We Try Harder", Avis should have doubled-down behind it - proving to consumers in this day and age how the customer experience is noticeable different, noticeable better because of Avis trying harder to please their consumers.  It's about having more agents, more smiles, more consumer choices, more flexibility, shorter lines, and fewer fees.  It's unique, it's ownable, it differentiates the brand from the other car rental companies.


An old "We Try Harder" commercial:


New "It's Your Space" commercial:



The new tagline, "It's Your Space" glorifies the car, which is nothing more than a commodity in this business.  The ad is generic, it could be for any car company.  It moves the brand to a place that's no longer unique in the American landscape.  My guess is this re-branding effort will be shorter lived than the new CMO can imagine and "We Try Harder" will be re-instated to its rightful place as a classic American tagline.

Who let the Red Lobsters into the Olive Garden?

Darden Restaurant Inc, the operator of Red Lobster and Olive Garden, has opened three Red Lobster - Olive Garden combined store locations in smaller cities that they believe cannot economically support standalone locations.

As the picture below shows, the locations have two separate entrances entrances and dinning rooms, but reportedly share a bar area, kitchen, and bathrooms. Customers in one dinning room cannot order from the menu of the adjoining restaurant.

On the surface the strategy appears to make strategic sense, reach new customers by creating economies of scale to control costs and deliver incremental revenue.  Nevertheless, I question the overall strategy.  I would argue both restaurant chains have lost they way from their historic brand compasses and now currently suffer from a lack of authenticity.  For example I would venture to guess that many middle class Americans question how fresh the seafood at Red Lobster really is, while Olive Garden is hardly seen as real italian.  The fact that consumer sentiment has drifted from these initial positions is due to business decisions putting profit in front of brand equity.  The two in one concept further plays up the chain aspects of both brands and helps continue diluting their authenticity.  Then there is the old marketing rule that if do two things well enough it means you don't do anything great.

While Yum brands has executed this strategy on many of their fast food and QSR brands (KFC, Taco Bell, Long John Silvers, and Pizza Hut) with a major difference versus Darden's full-service restaurants being that they usually have joint dinning rooms, which enable families to all order different foods and then sit together delivering a benefit for the customer.

Gap, heading down the wrong road?

Gap's struggles over the the last few years are no secret. In 2010, the Gap division has a total revenue of $5.8 billion, well below its pre-recession revenue peak of $6.2 billion in 2007. Unfortunately, 2011 isn't looking too much brighter for the Gap division, as North American stores report a same-store sales decline of (9%) versus year ago, while many of its competitors reported stronger than expected sales. These declines are despite the fact that Gap Inc. reportedly spent $70.5 million to advertise the Gap brand over the past year, according to the Kantar Media unit of WPP.

Given these troubles, its not a surprise that Gap management has been trying to shake things up in order to reignite growth. First, Gap tried refreshing its brand image by altering its longstanding logo - this effort turned into a public relations fiasco by causing a significant consumer uproar. Within what seemed like a matter of hours, Gap reversed course and restored its old logo, but not before proving just how out of touch the fashion giant is with its core consumers.

Now Gap is back at it again, trying to put a brand-aid on its sales challenge. Gap announced last week it would refreshen its image as the "People's Brand"

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/08/business/media/08adco.html?_r=1

The effort is being led by Gap's new chief global marketing officer, Seth Farbman, a former advertising executive from Ogilvy & Mather Worldwide. Farbman describes the “a people’s brand” positioning as a focus on fun, optimism and value for money.

Hmmm...does this positioning raise red flags to anybody? Thinking about this positioning from both a consumer and marketers perspective "Fun, optimism and value" sounds like the company may be confusion its Gap brand with its Old Navy brand. Doesn't Old Navy owns fun and value (at least in the mind of this consumer)?

So, why is Gap treading on its own tracks? Farbman claims “This is not a five-year turnaround strategy . . . This is a right-now.” Farbman is correct in that Gap needs to “set a clear point of view for the brand”, which it has clearly lost over the past few years; but Gap is losing sight of the bigger picture by not thinking about the longterm equity of both Gap and Old Navy.

I would venture to say Gap has struggled in its consumer positioning for a few reasons. First, Gap over-expanded its brand, which has caused it to lose some of its specialness. Second, as Gap Inc.'s other brands Old Navy (position: fun and value) and Banana Republic (position: sophistication and style), have effectively sandwiched the positioning of the Gap brand in the middle making it harder to find a unique space to own.

To get back to a position of growth, Gap needs to get back too its roots and focus on the basics.  Instead of trying to chase what it is not, Gap should embrace what it is - America's brand.  What made Gap so iconic in the first place.  The positioning should be optimistic and patriotic, with a focus on selling a modern take on the classical American lifestyle (bring on the swing dancing and all) - in summary a middle class version of Ralph Lauren.

What Gatorade Got Wrong...

If you read my lost post, I praised Gatorade's launch of G Series as an initiative with very strong business building potential because it helped reduce consumer confusion and increasing the brand's shelf presence. This post, however, takes a harsher stance on Gatorade's push to take their brand re-stage one step farther by also launching a premium priced line-up "G Series Pro". http://www.gatorade.com/default.aspx#gseriespro?s=gseriespro

G Series Pro is marketed as:

"Only available in pro locker rooms... until now. Originally developed
exclusively for pro athletes and grounded in years of hydration and sports
nutrition research at the Gatorade Sports Institute (GSSI)."

Now I get where Gatorade is coming from...trade in/across with G Series and then leverage G Series Pro to trade consumers up and capture a piece of the higher margin speciality market. I'm sure the consumer research shows very clear and distinct consumer segments that they believe they can better target with two line-ups.

That said, I think the positioning of the premium line-up has serious flaws that risk undermining the entire brand. By positioning G Series Pro as the line-up for pro athletes - where does that leave the base G Series line? Wasn't Gatorade's entire image built off of the fact that this is what the real pro's drank?

Recall the TV ads Gatorade built it's entire equity such as "I want to be like Mike ad". http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0AGiq9j_Ak

Well, evidently real athletes don't drink Gatorade anymore they only drink G Series Pro. Actually, what Gatorade is saying is real athletes haven't drank regular Gatorade for quite sometime. It may be good enough for you and me, but it's not good enough for real pro athletes anymore.

At the heart of Gatorade's flaw is that by lifting up the "Pro" line, they are degrading the base line - which is worrisome because it's always going to be the bulk of their business. Critics will say it's only on sale (at least for the time-being) exclusively at GNC (because evidently that's where 'real' athletes shop) and it will be marketed towards a small, specific niche, so it shouldn't interfere with the base line.

Maybe I'm being too tough, but it's not too often you see a business knock itself off the top of a mountain. To me, Gatorade or G Series or whatever they want to call the base business has lost some of it's magic, lost some of it's flair, and it's on the verge of being just another generic sports drink ala Powerade.

Gibberish Grade = D.

What Gatorade Got Right...

Recently Gatorade has been investing big behind the launch of G Series under their "The Game Has Evolved" campaign. G Series is the commercialization of a 3 step drink regime program established to maximize the performance of athletes by helping athletes (1) "Prime" before their competition, (2) "Perform" during the competition, and (3) "Recover" after. Each of the 3 types of drinks is suppose to be specially engineered to contribute as advertised.

http://www.gatorade.com/default.aspx#gseries?s=gseries

Now the instant reaction to watching this campaign is natural skepticism. Isn't Gatorade getting a little greedy here? Shouldn't they just be happy if athletes buy 1 Gatorade? Does Gatorade really expect us to believe if we drink all three we will actually see a noticeably better result? Is this all just marketing gibberish?


However, taking a step back the move is brilliant on a couple of accounts - regardless of if consumers buy into the regime push or not. The move instantly has two enormous benefits to Gatorade.


First, from a consumer perspective, it helps add clarity to what had become an increasingly difficult brand to understand. For years Gatorade's growth strategy had been to launch new line extensions to drive trial. However, all these line extensions, from a consumer standpoint had become very confusing, difficult to differentiate, and ultimately navigate when they got to shelf.


Second, from a trade perspective, it's a classic shelf grab tactic. By spending millions of dollars in advertising of the regime program Gatorade's retail partners are forced to dedicate more of their shelf space to bring the 3 step program to life. Even a few extra distribution slots at retailers and convenience stores around the country will translate to millions and million of dollars. This shelf space push is even more important following the collapse of Gatorade's Tiger Woods line extension.


So, regardless of whether or not consumers buy into the concept of a drink regime, or not; G Series will be a win for Gatorade.